The French Political Permacrisis: The Dawn of a New Political Reality
In October 2022, as Rishi Sunak assumed office as British prime minister, he was the fifth UK leader to take up the position in six years.
Triggered in the UK by Britain's EU exit, this signified unprecedented political turmoil. So how might we describe what is occurring in France, now on its sixth premier in 24 months – three of them in the last ten months?
The current premier, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have gained a brief respite on that day, abandoning Emmanuel Macron’s key pension reform in return for opposition Socialist votes as the cost of his administration's continuation.
But it is, at best, a temporary fix. The EU’s second-largest economy is locked in a ongoing governmental crisis, the scale of which it has not experienced for many years – possibly not since the establishment of its Fifth French Republic in 1958 – and from which there appears no simple way out.
Governing Without a Majority
Essential context: from the moment Macron called an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, France has had a divided assembly separated into three opposing factions – left, the far right and his own centre-right alliance – none with anything close to a majority.
Simultaneously, the country faces dual debt and deficit crises: its debt-to-GDP ratio and deficit are now almost twice the EU threshold, and strict legal timelines to pass a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are approaching.
In this challenging environment, both the prime ministers before Lecornu – Michel Barnier, who lasted from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were removed by parliament.
In September, the president appointed his close ally Lecornu as his latest PM. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu presented his government team – which proved to be largely unchanged from before – he encountered anger from allies and opponents alike.
To such an extent that the next day, he resigned. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the briefest-serving prime minister in recent French history. In a respectful address, he cited political rigidity, saying “partisan attitudes” and “personal ambitions” would make his job virtually unworkable.
Another twist in the tale: just hours after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron asked him to stay on for two more days in a last-ditch effort to salvage cross-party backing – a mission, to put it gently, filled with challenges.
Next, two ex-prime ministers openly criticized the embattled president. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and radical left France Unbowed (LFI) declined to engage with Lecornu, promising to vote down any and every new government unless there were early elections.
Lecornu persisted in his duties, talking to everyone who was prepared to hear him out. At the end of his 48 hours, he went on TV to say he believed “a path still existed” to avoid elections. The president’s office announced the president would appoint a new prime minister 48 hours later.
Macron kept his promise – and on Friday appointed … Sébastien Lecornu, again. So recently – with Macron helpfully sniping from the sidelines that the nation's opposing groups were “creating discord” and “entirely to blame for the turmoil” – was Lecornu’s critical test. Could he survive – and is he able to approve the crucial budget?
In a high-stakes speech, the young prime minister outlined his financial plans, giving the centre-left Socialist party (PS), who detest Macron’s controversial pension changes, what they were expecting: Macron’s key policy would be suspended until 2027.
With the right-wing LR already on board, the Socialists said they would not back no-confidence motions proposed against Lecornu by the extremist factions – meaning the administration would likely endure those votes, due on Thursday.
It is, nevertheless, far from guaranteed to be able to pass its planned €30bn budget squeeze: the PS explicitly warned that it would be demanding further compromises. “This move,” said its head, Olivier Faure, “is just the start.”
A Cultural Shift
The issue is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more opposition he'll face from the right. And, like the PS, the conservatives are themselves split on dealing with the administration – certain members remain eager to bring it down.
A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how tough Lecornu’s task – and longer-term survival – will be. A combined 264 lawmakers from the RN, LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR seek his removal.
To succeed, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 deputies or the LR’s 47 representatives (or both) to vote with them, Macron’s fifth precarious prime minister in two years is, like his predecessors, toast.
Most expect this to occur soon. Although, by some miracle, the dysfunctional assembly musters collective will to approve a budget this year, the outlook afterward look bleak.
So does an exit exist? Early elections would be doubtful to resolve the issue: polls suggest pretty much every party bar the RN would see reduced representation, but there would remain no decisive majority. A new prime minister would confront identical numerical challenges.
Another possibility might be for Macron himself to step down. After a presidential vote, his replacement would dissolve parliament and aim for a legislative majority in the ensuing legislative vote. But this also remains unclear.
Surveys show the next occupant of the Elysée Palace will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an strong possibility that French electorate, having chosen a far-right leader, might reconsider giving them parliamentary power.
Ultimately, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its leaders accept the new political reality, which is that decisive majorities are a thing of the past, winner-takes-all no longer applies, and negotiation doesn't mean defeat.
Many think that transformation will not be feasible under the existing governmental framework. “This isn't a standard political crisis, but a crise de régime” that will endure indefinitely.
“The system wasn't built to encourage – and actively discourages – the formation of ruling alliances common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”